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Is there a case for preferential treatment of the exposed sector in an economy
when compliance to an aggregate emissions constraint induced by an interna-
tional environmental agreement is mandatory? This question is being debated in
many countries in the context of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. We
address the issue in a general equilibrium framework and theoretically cover
several market structures, including perfect competition, the large country case
and oligopoly. We identify the conditions under which preferential treatment of
the exposed sector is not warranted from the point of view of maximizing social
welfare. In addition, we demonstrate that in the case of oligopoly, instituting a
more stringent environmental policy on the exposed sector might be proﬁt-
enhancing for this sector. This ﬁnding lends theoretical support to a speciﬁc
interpretation of the Porter hypothesis.
Keywords: ecological dumping, general equilibrium, emission constraint,
Kyoto Protocol, Porter hypothesis.
JEL Classiﬁcations: D6, F12, Q28.
1 Introduction
The question whether governments have an incentive to implement an
‘‘over-lax’’ environmental policy for reasons of international competi-
tiveness of the domestic industry, is one of the fundamental questions
raised in the so-called ‘‘ecological dumping’’ literature. This literature
speciﬁcally addresses the trade-off between increased competitiveness
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and increased pollution as a result of lax environmental taxation of the
economy’s exposed sector as compared to environmental taxes in the
sheltered sector. Several related issues are being dealt with in the trade
environment literature as well. For instance, the recent literature covers
concerns such as free trade potentially causing more pollution, the exis-
tence of pollution havens, and environmental policy inducing capital
ﬂight (see, e.g., Ulph, 1999; and Copeland and Taylor, 2003).
The theoretical results with regard to ecological dumping depend lar-
gely on the market structures that are being studied. In the case of perfect
competition on world markets and the absence of international spillovers,
ecological dumping is sub-optimal from a social welfare perspective
when taking into account the pollution damages (Rauscher, 1994; Neary,
2006). Hoel (1994) shows that differential treatment of domestic sectors
can be justiﬁed, in particular if trade policy is impossible and trans-
boundary pollution occurs. Rauscher (1994) suggests that in the case of a
large country it may be optimal to implement a more stringent environ-
mental policy on the exporting sector in order to improve the terms of
trade.
The literature on optimal environmental policy in an oligopolistic
world market is based on the strategic trade literature pioneered by
Spencer and Brander (1983), and Brander and Spencer (1985). The core
issue is whether welfare can be enhanced by changing the supply of the
export industry in the home country, given a supply reaction function of
foreign ﬁrms. Such a governmental objective can be brought about
through pre-commitment of subsidy provisions. A production (export)
subsidy and an economy-wide research and development subsidy are
typical examples of such a policy. Pre-commitments by the government
enable the domestic exporting ﬁrm to play the strategic game as a
Stackelberg leader rather than in a Nash fashion. Along the same line, the
strategic environmental policy literature addresses the issue whether an
‘‘over-lax’’ environmental policy can be used as an alternative to pro-
viding subsidies to domestic exporting ﬁrms (Conrad, 1993). Unlike other
domestic subsidies, however, over-lax environmental regulations also
entail a social cost in terms of increased pollution (Rauscher, 1994,
p. 832).
The case of oligopoly is interesting because it allows for strategic
policy making. The work on optimal environmental policy in an oli-
gopolistic world market has mainly been dealt with in a partial equilib-
rium framework. Barrett (1994) and Kennedy (1994) consider two ﬁrms,
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one domestic and the other foreign, competing on a third market. They
show that in the case of Cournot competition, welfare maximization in-
deed dictates an ‘‘over-lax’’ environmental policy in the sense that the
home ﬁrm pays less than the Pigouvian tax corresponding to the marginal
damage of pollution. This result is reversed in the case of Bertrand
competition. Rauscher (1994), and Elbers and Withagen (2002a, b)
consider the issue in a general equilibrium setting. Their analyses go
beyond the question whether or not environmental policy yields
Pigouvian outcomes, by considering discrimination in the stringency of
environmental policy between the domestic and the export sectors. Elbers
and Withagen (2002a, b) show that the partial equilibrium recommen-
dation may not hold in the case of a general equilibrium approach.
The policy context of the current paper is different from the studies
mentioned above. Instead of incorporating emissions in the welfare
function because of the damage they inﬂict, we introduce an upper bound
on emissions. The government derives the demand for emissions from the
ﬁrms’ cost functions and ﬁxes emission taxes by targeting emission levels
corresponding to the upper bound of the emissions use. Attempts to
increase production of the export sector by lowering the tax in this sector
should then necessarily be accompanied by a rise in the tax imposed on
the domestic sector. This implies that, unlike in the models discussed
above, a mere trade-off between additional emissions and additional
welfare is absent because of the binding resource constraint. Conse-
quently, the export sector cannot be considered in isolation and a general
equilibrium approach is in order, contrary to the ‘‘general practice in the
[Brander-Spencer] literature’’ (Bhagwati et al., 1998, p. 382).
The change in policy context is inspired by real-world developments,
such as the case of countries trying to meet agreements like the Kyoto
Protocol. The protocol determines concrete targets of carbon dioxide
emission reduction (Article 3, United Nations Conventions on Climate
Change). In such a policy setting, ecological dumping or preferential
treatment of the exposed sector is a pivotal and relevant issue. For
example, in The Netherlands a government advisory committee recently
recommended the introduction of a hybrid system of tradable permits that
is more favorable to exposed industries than to sheltered industries. The
main result of the present investigation is that we can identify a class of
economies where ecological dumping, in the sense of imposing a rela-
tively lax environmental policy on the exposed sector, is sub-optimal
from the welfare perspective of the country under consideration as well as
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from the point of view of proﬁtability of the exposed sector. What we do
not treat in this paper is international permit trade. Although this is a
relevant topic, particularly in the context of CO2 emissions reduction, we
would like to focus on differential treatment of sectors within an economy
in this paper. As a result, we do not discuss strategic behavior on an
international permits market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we
introduce our basic model with features largely identical to the models
discussed above. We also derive some preliminary results on perfect
competition and the large country case. Section 3 investigates the issue in
an oligopolistic structure of the world market. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model and Preliminary Results
2.1 Introduction
In this section, we outline the general equilibrium model that will serve as
a benchmark to compare the case of emission limits to the case usually
treated in the literature where pollution enters the social welfare function.
We also provide results for perfect competition and the ‘‘large country’’
case.
2.2 The Model
The economy produces two types of ﬁnal commodities with two inputs.
The ﬁrst ﬁnal commodity is consumed and produced only domestically.
Production takes place in the so-called sheltered sector consisting of
many price-taking ﬁrms. Hence, we do not account for imperfect com-
petition on the domestic market. The aggregate production function is
denoted by F1 and has capital, k1, and raw material, y1, as inputs.
Domestic consumption is denoted by c1: A second class of n ðn  1Þ
varieties of commodities is produced in the exposed sector. Aggregate
production of variety i ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . nÞ is described by a neoclassical
production function F i2, which has capital, k
i
2, and raw material, y
i
2, as
arguments. Following the strategic trade literature we assume that these
commodities are exported only ðxi2Þ, and not consumed domestically. The
third consumer commodity is imported, and its consumption is denoted
by c3. This commodity serves as the nume´raire. This rather rigid parti-
tioning of commodities is common in this literature. In case of perfect
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competition on the home market the results of this paper will not be
affected by allowing for domestic consumption of the good produced in
the sheltered sector. Alternatively, it has to be taken into account that the
additional externality caused by imperfect competition on the home
market calls for an appropriate policy instrument.
1
Capital is mobile domestically, but immobile internationally.
2
The
economy’s endowment of capital is k: The rate of return on capital is
denoted r. Raw material can be conceived of as energy, possibly from
fossil fuel, where exhaustibility of the resource is neglected. Pollution is
normalized such that using one unit of the raw material entails one unit of
polluting emission. To keep the analysis simple we abstract from abate-
ment. Due to international environmental agreements, the economy is
faced with an upper bound y on aggregate emissions. Regarding the
market price of raw material various assumptions can be made. One may
assume that the market price is zero and producers just have to pay an
emissions tax s, possibly differentiated across the sectors of the economy.
The assumption of a zero price is mathematically convenient. If the raw
material is of domestic origin, the assumption is innocuous, because it can
then be argued that supply is inelastic at a level that is higher than the
total allowed emissions. If the raw material is imported, it implies a rather
simple balance of payments condition, but then the assumption of a zero
market price is more difﬁcult to defend. The approach we choose is to
assume that the world market price of the raw material is ﬁxed, that the
country under consideration is importing all it needs, and that in the
absence of a cap on emissions the economy will import more than this
cap. This implies that national expenditures are ﬁxed, and they will be
denoted by the constant v  0.
Utility of the representative consumer is represented by a neoclassical
utility function Uðc1; c3Þ, implying that preferences involve consumption
1 For a discussion of how to deal with pollution in the case of imperfect
competition on the domestic output market, see Barnett (1980), Baumol and
Oates (1988), Shaffer (1995), and Simpson (1995).
2 The immobile factor is referred to as capital, but if applicable one can also
think of labor as the immobile factor. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) single out
asymmetric information between domestic investors and foreign investors as the
most important factor explaining the empirical evidence on international immo-
bility of capital. They argue that foreign investors are at a disadvantage due to
lack of information regarding issues such as purchase prices of assets and inputs,
output markets, and future government policies.
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only. Pollution does not play a role because of the assumption that the
emissions constraint is binding. Hence, the case where social welfare
increases by adopting a lower than allowed pollution level is excluded.
One can argue that the international agreement imposes a Pareto efﬁcient
distribution of pollution over its signatories, which entails lower emis-
sions than in the Nash equilibrium.
2.3 First-best in Perfect Competition and ‘‘Large’’ Country Case
The ﬁrst-best optimum in the economy is the allocation that maximizes
social welfare,
Uðc1; c3Þ; subject to:
c1 ¼ F1ðk1; y1Þ; ð2:1Þ
xi2 ¼ F i2ðki2; yi2Þ; ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nÞ; ð2:2Þ











yi2 ¼ y; ð2:5Þ
where pi2 ¼ pi2ðxi2Þ ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nÞ denote the inverse world demand
functions.
3
Note that Eq. (2.3) implies equilibrium on the current account:
the value of the imported consumer commodity plus the expenditures on
raw material equals the value of exported commodities. The Lagrangian
of the problem reads as:
3 In the next section, where we discuss oligopoly, these functions will also
depend on supply by foreign countries.
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L ¼ Uðc1; c3Þ þ l1 F1ðk1; y1Þ  c1 þ
Xn
i¼1







2ðpi2Þ  c3  v
" #



































þ l3½xi2ðpi2Þ þ pi2
dxi2
dpi2
 ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2; :::; n: ð2:9Þ
2.4 Implementation with Trade Policy
In this setting, many results regarding the implementation of the ﬁrst-best
optimum in a decentralized economy are straightforward modiﬁcations of
earlier work by, for instance, Hoel (1996) and Rauscher (1997), and they
have become standard inferences in the theory of international trade (see,
e.g., Dixit, 1985). We will brieﬂy describe the main outcomes. In order to
comply with the international norm given by y, the government levies
emission taxes s1 and si2 ði ¼ 1; 2; ::: ; nÞ.4 Tax revenues are recycled to
consumers in a lump sum fashion. Alternatively, the government installs a
system of tradable emissions permits. Such a system is uniform if trade is
allowed among all domestic sectors, including the sheltered sector. The
4 For the sake of brevity of notation and without loss of generality the given
world market price of energy is included in the s’s.
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system is differentiated if individual sectors have their own system, with
trade limited to those ﬁrms belonging to the individual sectors. In the
present context, the policy instruments are equivalent: taxes can achieve
the optimal emission levels or one can set the optimal amount of permits
(possibly differentiated across sectors) and then leave it to the market to
get the ‘‘right’’ price. We will therefore in the remainder of this paper only
refer to taxes.
A few deﬁnitions are in order. We make a distinction between
market power of the country on the one hand and of individual ﬁrms
on the other. The country is large with respect to variety i if, in the
ﬁrst-best optimum, the price elasticity of demand for variety i is ﬁnite.
Otherwise the country is small with respect to the variety. As a con-
sequence, all individual ﬁrms producing a variety for which the
economy is small can be aggregated and described as a representative
competitive ﬁrm. Within the class of commodities for which the
country is large, a further distinction can be made. In some of these
‘‘large’’ sectors a continuum of competitive ﬁrms is active, allowing for
aggregation into a single representative ﬁrm as well. Each of the other
‘‘large’’ sectors will be assumed to consist of a single ﬁrm, exploiting
its market power on the world market. The oligopoly case is studied in
the next section. Deﬁne:
ti ¼  1
e^i2




¼ pi2ð1 tiÞ; ði ¼ 1; 2; ::: ; nÞ;
p3 ¼ 1; s ¼ s1 ¼ si2 ¼
s
l^3
; ði ¼ 1; 2; ::: ; nÞ; r ¼ ^r
l^3
;
where hats denote the ﬁrst-best outcomes, and e^i2 is the price elasticity of
world market demand for the second commodity which, evaluated at the
optimum, is smaller than minus unity. Due to the concavity/convexity
assumptions for the functions involved, the necessary conditions corre-
sponding with the ﬁrst-best social optimum are also sufﬁcient. Observe
the following.
(i) The pair ðk^1; y^1Þ maximizes proﬁts p1F1ðk1; z1Þ  rk1  sy1 of
(aggregate) ﬁrm 1. This is the case because in the ﬁrst-best solution
the pair maximizes:









(ii) For the same reason ðk^i2; y^i2Þ maximizes proﬁts pi2F i2ðki2; yi2Þ
rki2  syi2 of the (aggregate) ﬁrm of exporting sector i for which
the country is small.
(iii) Also ðk^i2; y^i2Þ maximizes proﬁts qi2F i2ðki2; yi2Þ  rki2  syi2 of the
(aggregate) ﬁrm of the competitive exporting sector i for which the
country is large.
(iv) The triple ðpi2; ki2; yi2Þ maximizes pi2xi2ðpi2Þ  rki2  syi2 subject to
F i2ðki2; yi2Þ ¼ xi2ðpi2Þ for each exporting sector i with a single supplier,
exploiting its market power.
(v) The pair ðc^1; c^3Þ maximizes Uðc1; c3Þ subject to:





2 þ T  v;
where T denotes recycled export tariff revenues.
(vi) Finally, all markets clear at the proposed prices.
Hence, we can state:
Proposition 1: The ﬁrst-best optimum can be implemented in a decen-
tralized economy by:
(i) imposing a uniform emission tax; and
(ii) imposing export taxes on the ﬁrms in sectors where the economy is
‘‘large’’ but where the individual ﬁrms do not exploit this.
The main implication of Proposition 1 is that there is no need to differ-
entiate environmental policy across sectors if the country is small on all
world markets or if its individual ﬁrms exploit their market power on the
world market, or if the government can levy an export tax on ‘‘large’’ but
competitive sectors. This result is similar to the result obtained when
pollution is affecting social welfare directly.
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2.5 Implementation without Trade Policy
If export taxes are not allowed, due to for instance regulations of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the ﬁrst-best optimum cannot be
reached and we should look for a second-best solution.
Proposition 2: Suppose trade policy is not a viable option. Then in an
optimum, higher emission taxes than for the sheltered sector should be
imposed on those competitive exposed sectors for which the country is
large.




































¼ si2 (see observation ii). For all competitive sectors































where C denotes the set of varieties in which the country as a whole is
large, but for which the individual ﬁrms are competitive. If emission taxes
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Hence, welfare is marginally increased if the tax policy improves the
terms of trade. This can be achieved by levying higher emissions taxes on
the competitive exposed sectors than on the sheltered sectors.
The intuition behind this result is simple. Trade policy would increase
the terms of trade, and an emission tax is effectively doing the same.
3 Oligopoly
3.1 Introduction
The preceding section considered the issue of strategic environmental
policy in the presence of perfect competition and monopolistic market
structures. In the present section, we focus on oligopoly, and allow for
strategic interaction among ﬁrms as well as among governments, in a
two-country setting. We use the superscripts f and h to refer to the foreign
and home country, respectively, and consider the case of a single domestic
producer ðn ¼ 1Þ of the exportable acting as a duopolist on the world
market. The inverse demand function reads as p2ðx2Þ ¼ p2ðxh2 þ xf2Þ.
3.2 Nash Equilibrium
Following the same approach as in Proposition 2, totally differentiating




s1dy1 þ s2dy2 þ xh2
dp2




We can then readily establish:
Proposition 3: Suppose the home country’s policy maker takes foreign
supply as given. Then it is optimal to set equal emissions taxes or to
install a uniform system of tradable emissions permits.
Proof: If dxf2 ¼ 0 then s1 ¼ s2, which, together with dy1 þ dy2 ¼
dy ¼ 0, yields dW ¼ 0.
Consequently, if given the international environmental agreement the
governments play a simultaneous move Nash game, differential treatment
of the two sectors is sub-optimal. The terms of trade effect is already
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incorporated by the Nash-Cournot duopolists. However, matters change if
by manipulating the domestic emissions tax rates foreign supply can be
affected. In that case, starting from equal taxes, a policy that reduces
foreign supply is beneﬁcial, as can be seen from Eq. (3.1).
3.3. Stackelberg Equilibrium
We turn now to the case where the foreign country is a Stackelberg fol-
lower, and the home country is the Stackelberg leader. In the game, there
are essentially four players, the two oligopolistic ﬁrms and the two gov-
ernments. The individual ﬁrms are Cournot-Nash players on the world
product market and take their rival’s supply as given. One way to model
the game at the policy makers’ level is to assume that the foreign gov-
ernment, the follower, takes the tax rates set by the home government as
given, and maximizes its own welfare given these taxes. However, this
complicates matters for the following reason. The tax structure in the home
country does not completely determine the home country’s supply on the
world market, because it is also affected by the supply of the foreign ﬁrm,
which is subject to taxation in the foreign country. Therefore, with this
setup the foreign country can still have a considerable indirect effect on
supply by the home ﬁrm, which we would like to exclude. In order to
overcome this complication we assume that the foreign government only
observes world market supply by the home ﬁrm, takes this as given, and
subsequently determines its own optimal tax structure. As a result, for any
given xh2 the foreign government sets uniform emissions taxes that maxi-
mize social welfare. These taxes then also generate foreign supply. Sub-
sequently, the home government takes the overall reaction function of the
foreign country into account in determining its own optimal taxes. For-
mally, an equilibrium of the game is a set of domestic and foreign tax rates
and supply to the world market such that:
(a) given the home world market supply, the foreign country sets the
emissions taxes optimally so as to maximize its social welfare, and
(b) taking foreign supply as a function of home supply as given, the home
country maximizes social welfare by setting home emissions taxes.
For the outcome of the game, the slope of the foreign reaction function is
crucial. If the foreign reaction function is upward sloping, then, starting
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from a situation of undifferentiated emission taxes, the home government
wants to decrease its own supply to the world market, implying a welfare
increase; see (3.1). The welfare improvement is then accomplished by
increasing the tax rate applying to the exposed sector. If the foreign
reaction function is downward sloping, a decrease of the tax rate imposed
on the exposed sector is in order. The issue is closely related to the
strategic trade policy literature (see Brander and Spencer, 1985; Helpman
and Krugman, 1985), where the question whether the outputs of the
oligopolists are strategic complements or strategic substitutes is crucial
for policy. In two papers, Collie and de Meza (1986; 2003) address this
problem in a partial equilibrium model, but not in the context of a general
equilibrium environmental policy setting. They show that with a constant
price elasticity demand function, the reaction functions in a Nash equi-
librium are downward sloping if and only if demand is elastic. However,
we show below that in our general equilibrium setting the sign may be
reversed. To do so, we employ the following speciﬁcations:
Uðc1; c3Þ ¼ ln c1 þ ln c3; ð3:2Þ
F1ðk1; y1Þ ¼ ka1y1a1 ; 0 < a < 1; ð3:3Þ
F2ðk2; y2Þ ¼ kb2y1b2 ; 0 < b < 1; ð3:4Þ
p2ðx2 þ xf2Þ ¼ ðx2 þ xf2Þ1=e; e < 1: ð3:5Þ
Lemma 1: Suppose preferences, world demand, and technology are given
by (3.2)–(3.5). Suppose that the foreign economy takes xh2 as given and




Proof: See the Appendix.
With the aid of Lemma 1 we can now state and prove:
Proposition 4: Suppose preferences, world demand, and technology are
given by (3.2)–(3.5). Suppose that the foreign economy takes xh2 as given
and ﬁnds itself in a general equilibrium. Let the home country act as a
Stackelberg leader. Then sh2  sh1.
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Proof: Consider (3.1). Taking into account that dy1 ¼ dy2 and omitting
the sufﬁx h, we have:
dW ¼ @U
@c3
½s1  s2dy1 þ xh2
dp2




Starting from s1 ¼ s2; we see that welfare increases if xf2 decreases,
ceteris paribus. Therefore, in view of Lemma 1, policy should lead to a
lower xf2. This is achieved by increasing s2 and decreasing s1, which also
makes the ﬁrst term between brackets positive.
The proposition yields the important insight that for the class of
speciﬁcations under consideration, the exposed sector needs to be taxed
more heavily than the sheltered sector if the home country is a Stackel-
berg leader. Although the optimality of this policy has not been assessed
for other classes than the one considered here, the relevance of the result
is that it runs counter to what is commonly advocated in policy circles.
3.4 Political Economy Considerations
In view of political economy aspects such as rent seeking and lobbying,
which may prevent the feasibility or the acceptability of the new tax
policy, we analyze its effect on the proﬁtability of the exposed sector. This
is, however, not a direct test of the Porter hypothesis, which claims that
stringent environmental policy increases proﬁtability. In our model re-
search and development do not play a role, whereas innovation offsets are
pertinent to the Porter hypothesis. Following Palmer et al. (1995), how-
ever, one may argue that an increased competitive position of domestic
exporters as a consequence of environmental policy is in line with the
Porter hypothesis.
The unit cost function of the exposed sector reads:





Proﬁt maximization boils down to the maximization of:
P2ðxh2Þ ¼ pðxh2 þ xf2Þxh2  cðr; s2Þxh2;
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with foreign supply given. With the inverse demand function (3.5) and
using the ﬁrst-order necessary condition for proﬁt maximization we have:
P2ðxh2Þ ¼
ðxh2Þ2










Therefore, in comparing the Nash and the Stackelberg tax regimes,
proﬁtability is enhanced if domestic output increases (since e < 1Þ, or if
foreign supply decreases relative to home supply. Indeed, home supply of
the traded commodity may increase compared to the Nash equilibrium.
Obviously, this is not the case when the two equilibria are close to each
other, because in that case, by virtue of Lemma 1, the Stackelberg leader
should increase the emission tax on the exposed sector. However, when
the economies differ considerably, the Nash equilibrium tax rate is no
longer necessarily between the two Stackelberg tax rates.
Table 1 provides a numerical illustration of this result, using the fol-
lowing base parameters: initial capital endowment is k
h ¼ 10; the upper
limits on emissions are yh ¼ 6 and yf ¼ 20 ; the price elasticity of world
demand e equals –2, and the production elasticities of capital are
a ¼ b ¼ 0:75 for both countries. In Table 1, the initial capital endowment
of the foreign country k
f
runs from 10 to 24.
As expected, when the economies are similar with regard to their
initial capital the Nash tax rate is between the Stackelberg tax rates for
the sheltered and exposed sectors. Moreover, the exposed sector suffers
from the new tax regime in terms of proﬁtability. However, with an
increasing difference in capital endowments, the exposed sector beneﬁts















24 0.1283 0.1991 7.7698 0.0009 0.0840 0.0871 4.0151 9.0628 0.1704
22 0.1185 0.9188 7.6546 0.0168 0.0852 0.0883 3.9997 8.5373 0.1802
20 0.1087 1.7987 7.4762 0.0573 0.0865 0.0896 3.9823 7.9968 0.1913
18 0.1003 2.7363 7.1963 0.1196 0.0879 0.0910 3.9627 7.4392 0.2039
16 0.0951 3.4707 6.7829 0.1834 0.0894 0.0925 3.9402 6.8620 0.2186
14 0.0937 3.8169 6.2471 0.2282 0.0910 0.0942 3.9140 6.2615 0.2360
12 0.0946 3.8872 5.6338 0.2572 0.0929 0.0959 3.8828 5.6332 0.2568
10 0.0964 3.8607 4.9722 0.2839 0.0949 0.0979 3.8450 4.9704 0.2824
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more from the higher tax rate, relative to the tax rate of the sheltered
sector. Although the exposed sector pays more taxes than the sheltered
sector, the tax rate is considerably smaller than in the Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, being a Stackelberg leader is not only welfare enhancing at
the country level, but it also increases proﬁtability in the sector that is
subject to the more stringent environmental policy. However, the table
also shows that the proﬁt differential is positive when the foreign
country is relatively well endowed with both capital and allowable
emissions. In such circumstances it is more difﬁcult to justify the
Stackelberg leadership for the home country, at least within the present
model.
4 Conclusions
This paper revisits the issue of ecological dumping. The main question is
whether governments have reason to give preferential treatment to their
exposed sector. The novelty of our approach is that we consider several
world market structures, with an emphasis on oligopoly, in a general
equilibrium setting. Moreover, rather than incorporating emissions in the
social welfare function, we assume the implementation of a policy that
puts a mandatory upper bound on aggregate emissions. This policy
constellation is realistic given that many countries are currently trying to
meet restrictions imposed by agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol.
The cases of perfect competition and of a large country produce the
expected results. Differential treatment is unwarranted if perfect compe-
tition prevails. When the country under consideration is large and con-
ventional trade policy instruments cannot be used, the exposed sector
should be taxed more heavily than the domestic sector, except when this
sector can reap the terms of trade beneﬁts by itself. The more interesting
case, however, is oligopoly. It has been shown that in a simultaneous
move Nash equilibrium of the tax game played by two governments,
equilibrium emissions taxes do not differ between sectors. However, we
show that in a Stackelberg equilibrium the leader may ﬁnd it optimal to
tax the exposed sector more heavily than the sheltered sector. We illus-
trate this theoretical result in an example, employing Cobb-Douglas type
speciﬁcations for the functions involved.
Our theoretical results have important implications for the policy
debates on globalization and the environment, and the issue of har-
monization of environmental policies across countries. Our results shed
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new light on the frequently cited tension between trade and environ-
mental policy objectives by suggesting that fear of ecological dumping
can hardly be substantiated by means of standard neoclassical theory.
Obviously, in the real world matters are more complicated than we can
currently capture in theoretical microeconomic models. Speciﬁcally, the
assumption of governments behaving as strict social-welfare maxi-
mizing agents aiming to design and implement environmental policies
in a socially optimal fashion is open to discussion and can be
modiﬁed. It is nowadays customary to think of governments as policy
brokers bringing together different interest groups with conﬂicting
stakes in policy outcomes. Strictly speaking, it is therefore too early to
completely rule out the possibility that policies of ecological dump-
ing can be justiﬁed on the basis of social optimality grounds. How-
ever, it is equally implausible to expect the game of interest groups
competing for policy inﬂuence to end up by necessity in a situation
where proponents of eco-dumping will unequivocally dominate the
game.
There are several interesting avenues for further research. One such
avenue ties on to a less desirable characteristic of our approach where
the information the Stackelberg leader needs in order to design an
optimal policy is huge. Another highly relevant avenue concerns the
real-world situation where not all countries are signatories. Overall, our
results suggest the prevalence of a strong link between the design of
international environmental agreements and the design of policies with
respect to the environment and trade. A closer future investigation of
this link will be worthwhile, both from a theoretical and a policy per-
spective.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The foreign country takes supply by the home
country as given. Therefore it imposes a uniform emissions tax (see
Proposition 4). The system of general equilibrium conditions for the
foreign country is given by the following set of equations (explicit ref-


































y1 þ y2 ¼ y ðA:6Þ
k1 þ k2 ¼ k; ðA:7Þ
p1ka1y
1a
1 ¼ p2x2  v; ðA:8Þ
x2 ¼ kb2y1b2 : ðA:9Þ
Equations (A.1) and (A.2) follow from cost minimization, and Eq. (A.3)
follows from perfect competition in the sheltered sector. Equations (A.4)
and (A.5) deﬁne proﬁt maximization of the exposed sector, and Eqs. (A.6)
and (A.7) are self-evident. Equation (A.8) follows from utility maximi-
zation and equilibrium on the current account: p1c1 ¼ c3 ¼ p2x2  v.
Finally, Eq. (A.9) is the production function of the exposed sector. The
system is solved as follows. Using Eqs. (A.1), (A.2), (A.6) and (A.7) we
obtain:









k þ bð1 aÞ
b a y;
ðA:10Þ
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y  ð1 bÞk
h i
: ðA:12Þ





ðx2 þ xh2Þ1=ex2½þ x2e½x2þxh2
r
: ðA:13Þ
The right-hand side of (A.5) is the unit cost function of the exposed ﬁrm.
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and subsequently from (A.14) that:
 ð1 aÞ
k  a sr y




Now suppose that the Lemma does not hold: x2 increases and xh2
decreases, so that xh2=x2 decreases. Then, ﬁrst of all, the right-hand side of
(A.16) decreases. Suppose b > a, in which case s=r decreases because of
(A.14), and therefore, the left-hand side of (A.16) increases. This con-
tradicts that the right-hand side of Eq. (A14) decreases. Suppose b < a, in
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which case s=r increases because of Eq. (A14), and therefore, the left-
hand side of Eq. (A.16) increases, yielding a contradiction again. (
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